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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
is not so sacrosanct that it cannot yield when there is danger of impairment of
public morals in allowing free entrance and reporting of filthy sexual episodes.
Heavy criticism might be leveled at the majority for its dogmatic invocation
of the unius expressio, alterius exciusio canon decried by modern writers8 0 The
concept of statutory analogy"" would have induced an opposite result, for the
unbridled publicity given this case is an example of the precise evil which the
legislature intended to correct by section four of the Judiciary Law. This is espec82
ially clear in that the trend, as evinced by the legislative history of that section,
has been to allow the trial judge greater latitude in excluding the prurient from
attempting to view and report salacious testimony in the courts.
The connected case of United Press Association v.Valente 3 tested the right
of the press to object to an exclusion order. The Court held that the 'applicable
language of the Judiciary Law, "The sitting of every court within this state shall
be public, and every citizen may freely attend the same, 84 is to be historically
construed8 5 as affording freedom of access and protection from arrest to those
whose presence was essential to the work of the court, and affords no rights to
mere spectators. Hence an accused may waive his right to a public trial if the
trial judge permits.
Judge Desmond, in a separate opinion, concurs with the result on the ground
of his dissent in the Jelke case, citing the majority's ratio decidendi as specious.
The dissent joins issue on the ground that common law tradition, 0 as embodied
in section four of the Judiciary Law, guarantees the public an enforceable right
to view and report judicial proceedings. The dissenters also feared that justice
might be subverted if the judge and the accused could combine to bar the press
and public from certain trials.
Evidence
In People v. Dales,8 7 defendant was convicted of forgery in the second degree
80. See LENHOFF, CASES AND COMMENTS ON LEGISLATION, 692 (1949); Beutel,
Problems of Interpretation Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, 27 NEB. L.
REv. 485, 491 (1948).
81. LENHOFF, op. cit. supra, note 80, at 945.
83. Section 4 was amended in 1945 to include sodomy and fillation proceedings.
83. 308 N. Y. 71, 123 N. E. 2d 777 (1954).
84. N. Y. JUDICIARY LAW §4 (3).
85. The court referred to 1 COLONIAL LAWS OF NEw YORK 159-160 (1894),
respecting freedom from arrest of all persons voluntarily attending court on

court business.

86. "These words are of great importance, for all causes ought to be heard,
ordered, and determined before the judges of the kings courts openly In the
kings courts, whither all persons may resort." COKE'S SECOND INSTITUTES, V. 1,
p. 703 (1797); (emphasis supplied).

87. 309 N. Y. 97, 127 N. E. 2d 829 (1955).
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for uttering, with intent to defraud, a promissory note; the maker's name, purportedly that of the defendant's employee, had actually been attached by the
defendant, and the note described a nonexistent truck as collateral. In the Court
of Appeals, defendant argued that three other conditional sales contracts, each
involving either a spurious signature or a fictitious vehicle described as collateral,
should not have been admitted in evidence. Furthermore, defendant contended
that the trial court should have ordered production both of the Grand
Jury minutes and of a written statement given by the employee to police
before trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that the three
tainted conditional sales contracts were admissable to show "intent to defraud"
even though their admission proved independent crimes; the defendant claimed
inadmissability because of his alleged authority to sign in the instant case. The
court further decided that both the Grand Jury minutes and the written statement
were properly withheld from the defendant.
"The general rule of evidence applicable to criminal trials is that the state
cannot prove against a defendant any crime not alleged in the indictment, either
as a foundation for a separate punishment, or as aiding the proofs that he is guilty
of the crime charged."88 But this rule applies "only when proof of another crime
can have no purpose, except to show that the accused is a criminal who having
committed one offense would be likely to commit another, and, therefore, was
guilty of the one charged."8 9 The rule generally does not apply in forgery cases
where proof of similar forgeries passed within a reasonable time of the indictment
are considered admissable for the purpose of showing intent,90 guilty knowledge,91
motive, 2 common scheme, or freedom from mistake,93 which are all elements of
the crime charged.
Public policy dictates that "the secrecy of the proceedings before the grand
jury must be preserved inviolate." 94 A grand juror who wilfully discloses grand
jury secrets or a stenographer, appointed to take testimony before a grand jury,
who permits any person other than the district attorney to read such testimony is
guilty of a misdemeanor unless such disclosure is made pursuant to a lawful court
directive.95 If the district attorney makes use of such minutes at the trial, however,
the defendant is entitled to examine them.9 6 If the prosecution fails to make use
88. People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 291, 61 N. E. 286, 293 (1901).
89. People v. Gaffey, 182 N. Y. 257, 262, 74 N. E. 836, 838 (1905).
90. People v. Everhardt, 104 N. Y. 591, 11 N. E. 62 (1887).
91.

Ibid.

92. People v. Dolan, 186 N. Y. 4, 78 N. E. 569 (1906).
93. Ibid..
94. People v. Miller, 257 N. Y. 54, 57, 177 N. E. 306, 307 (1931); N. Y. CODE
CRi.

Paoc. §§265, 952-t.
N. Y. PENAL LAw §§1783, 1784.

95.

96. People v. Miler, 257 N. Y. 54, 177 N. E. 306 (1931).
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of the grand jury minutes at the trial, then if defense counsel seeks them for crossexamination he may examine them only if the court, upon inspection, has found
that they contain material at variance with the testimony given by the particular
witness on the stand.9 7 The rule as to disclosure of statements in the custody of
the district attorney, for purposes of cross examination, is similar to that applying
98
to grand jury minutes.
In People v. Lee 9 the Court deal with a decision of the Appellate
Division1 which reversed the convictions of two defendants (Sarra and McCarthy) for admitted error in the admission of evidence, and dismissed the indictment as to the third (Lee) on the ground that the complaintant's identification of
him as a participant in an alleged robbery and assault was insufficient to go to the
jury. On appeal Sarra and McCarthy claimed that the lower court erred in not
dismissing the indictment as to them, because complainant had a criminal record
and was not to be believed. On cross appeal the State argued, as to Lee, that the
Appellate Division lacked the power to dismiss his indictment. The court held
that the questions of fact were for the jury in both cases.
The court reindorsed the well entrenched principle that pollution of the
source of testimony does not automatically brand it as mendacious, 2 but due to
the admitted error a new trial was ordered. The court found error in the dismissal
of Lee's indictment by the Appellate Division because there was sufficient evidence
upon which the jury could base its decision.
Charging Lower Counts
The common law rule has been incorporated into statute s that, if a defendant
could be found guilty of a lesser degree of any crime charged in the indictment,
the trial judge must submit such lower offense 4 unless no conceivable view of the
evidence would allow the jury to find the defendant innocent of the higher crime
97.
98.
99.

See, e.g., People v. Boniello, 303 N. Y. 619, 101 N. E. 2d 483 (1951).
People v. Walsh, 262 N. Y. 140, 186 N. E. 422 (1933).
308 N. Y. 302, 125 N. E. 2d 580 (1955).

1. 283 App. Div. 876, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 201 (2d Dep't 1955).
2. People v. Landers, 264 N. Y. 119, 190 N. E. 204 (1934); People v. Ai'ata,
255 N. Y. 374, 174 N. E. 758 (1931).

3.

N. Y. CODE CRIM.

PROC.

§444; "Upon an indictment for a crime consisting

of different degrees, the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degree
charged in the indictment, and guilty of any degree inferior thereto, or of an
attempt to commit the crime..."
§445 pprovides, "In all other (than §444) cases, the defendant may be found
guilty of any crime, the commission of which is necessarily included In that
with which he is charged in the indictment."
4. People v. Lapolte, 253 N. Y. 573, 171 N. E. 788 (1930); People v, SilerW,
246 N. Y. 262, 158 N. E. 615 (1927).

